Introduction
Britannia Shield. Something of a gimmick from the Tories. One idea doesn’t make a strong position, although it does send a signal.
Is Be Ready https://beready.campaign.gov.uk/be-ready-for-emergencies/ all Labour has got? A wind up torch and radio, some cans of beans and soup, water, cash and toilet roll. And don’t forget food for the cat/dog.
It’s time for a new approach to being secure and being resilient as a country that shows people that this is an important topic, never more so, and that there is someone responsible and accountable for it, and a team who will deliver and manage it.
What’s the problem?
We went through COVID and clearly weren’t ready for a global pandemic. Hadn’t thought it through, didn’t have structures in place to deal with it, just weren’t ready.
The threat level hasn’t been this high since I was a child, when a nuclear attack by Russia felt like a real possibility. What we face now is more complicated and more diverse: a phoney war that keeps rising in intensity, the prospect of a further incursion into Europe, and physical reconnaissance of the things we depend on. Russian vessels have been found loitering over the undersea cables that carry data and the pipelines that convey electricity, oil and gas.
Digital security is a relatively new threat, and it isn’t only hostile states. It is also organised criminals, and people who do it for fun. All of them now armed with far more powerful tools than before.
And then there’s the changing climate, whatever you think its cause is. Long hot spells, drought, and then rainfall that arrives harder and faster than the land and the drains can take.
And finally, American support can no longer be assumed in the way it once was. We gave our full support to the US in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Gulf War. Starmer was equivocal on Iran and it’s arguable as to whether he was right about that given everything that’s happened since. He could maybe have played it more tactfully. It wasn’t the first time though that the UK had been equivocal; take Vietnam and Grenada are examples. But Trump took the UK’s position on Iran very badly.
Perhaps rightly though, Trump has pointed out that other countries should stand on their own two feet. Article 5 still stands and we remain in NATO. But the days of assuming the Americans will arrive, and arrive early, are likely behind us. We need to be stronger ourselves while keeping the benefit of mutual protection.
We took the so-called Peace Dividend and cut defence spending from 5% of GDP in 1980 to 2.3% by 2025. That doesn’t now look like a smart move, even if it seemed commensurate with the threat at the time. Our expenditure and NATO’s as a whole has left Europe under-defended and, alongside a weak response to the seizing of Crimea, has enabled Putin to pursue his expansionist agenda, most recently and most dramatically into Ukraine.
We live in a world that is more insecure and vulnerable than it has been for some time.
We do some things well:
Intelligence and counter-terrorism. JTAC, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, is widely copied abroad. The response to the Salisbury Novichok attack was fast and well co-ordinated. The security operation for the 2012 Olympics worked.
Cyber. The National Cyber Security Centre is a genuine world leader and other countries have built theirs on its model.
Specific scientific capability. Porton Down. The Vaccine Taskforce, which procured faster than almost anyone in 2020 even while the rest of the pandemic response struggled.
Flood warning. The Environment Agency’s warning service is good, and the Thames Barrier has worked for forty years.
The documents are good. The National Risk Register is a serious piece of work, honestly done and published. The problem has never been that we can’t see the risks. It’s that seeing them is nobody’s full-time job, and acting on them is nobody’s at all.
But our approach is piecemeal and too often ad hoc. Recent examples make that very clear.
On 14 October 2026 a new Flood and Drought Resilience Taskforce met for the first time, chaired by the Floods and Drought Minister, bringing together more than fifty organisations: the Environment Agency, the Met Office, mayoral authorities, fire and rescue services, and the farming, water and insurance industries. It follows the hottest summer on record and the driest July in almost two centuries, with the Met Office warning of a heightened potential for storms and flooding.
Not a bad idea but it’s the second time this has been done. A Floods Resilience Taskforce was set up in September 2024 and met for the first time that month, with much the same purpose and many of the same people round the table.
And then there’s the Be Ready campaign https://beready.campaign.gov.uk/be-ready-for-emergencies/. It comes from the Cabinet Office. A wind up torch and radio, some cans of beans and soup, water, cash and toilet roll. And don’t forget food for the cat/dog. Not a bad idea but a separate initiative which doesn’t seem as important as protecting our critical national infrastructure as a first order priority.
That is what happens when nobody is in charge of preparation and execution. We convene, we disband, and two years later we convene again. Nor is there clear responsibility, because it is all so fragmented.
The Home Office as the current owner of some aspects of security and resilience is too big and too unwieldy. It runs MI5, counter-terrorism, policing policy and Border Force. It also prints passports, processes visas and administers asylum claims - a very large transactional business handling millions of applications a year.
This admin competes for the same minister’s attention, and the transactional half always wins, because backlogs make headlines weekly and counter-terrorism makes them rarely. This leaves the minister and the department distracted by day-to-day issues. Those tactical problems prevent it from sufficient high level strategic longer-term thinking which would get the country onto the front foot.
Very many potential banana skins to slip up on for a Home Office minister. Change would surely be welcome.
Resilience has no home at all. Britain is a structural outlier among comparable countries. France, Germany, Italy, Canada and Australia - all have a ministry that owns civil protection. We have a method instead: the Lead Government Department principle, where a crisis is assigned to whichever ministry knows the subject best. Defra takes floods. The Department of Health takes pandemics. If it gets too big, the Cabinet Office convenes COBR and the whole of government pivots at once.
The method has strengths. It is flexible, it avoids a rigid bureaucracy, and because the Cabinet Office sits at the centre, a COBR-level crisis instantly commands the highest political authority in the land.
It has one fatal weakness. There is no minister whose job is to wake up every day thinking about where the next crisis will come from and what to do to avoid it or manage it most effectively if it does occur. Preparation has no owner. Response has several. When everybody is responsible according to the type of crisis, nobody is accountable for whether we are ready.
Operational delivery, meanwhile, runs bottom-up through forty-odd Local Resilience Forums under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004: partnerships of police, fire, councils and the NHS that only activate when something happens.
Under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, statutory legal duties for emergency planning sit with principal local authorities - that’s county or district councils. Below that, many parishes are working on their own preparations. The Ready Together campaign https://readytogether.co.uk/ based on research by the University of Nottingham is trying to bring some consistency and quality. It’s promoted by the unlikely partnership of Prince William and Ross Kemp.
National Emergency SMSs have taken over from the ringing of church bells. Another separate initiative with separate ownership - the Cabinet Office for this one. During World War II, a strict ban was placed on ringing church bells across the UK; they were strictly reserved to warn the public of a hostile military invasion by enemy paratroopers.
In short, it’s all very itsy bitsy.
What other countries do
Two possible models and one big lesson.
The centralised European model. France’s Ministry of the Interior runs the National Police, the Gendarmerie, domestic intelligence, elections, passports and civil protection. Germany’s federal interior ministry runs the federal police, the criminal police office and domestic intelligence, with everyday policing left to the Länder. Italy centralises public security but keeps intelligence reporting to the Prime Minister.
The federal public safety model. Canada built Public Safety Canada in 2003, grouping the RCMP, the border agency and the domestic intelligence service. Australia created Home Affairs in 2017 for federal police and the Border Force, then deliberately moved domestic intelligence back out to the Attorney-General to preserve the separation.
And the American model. The Department of Homeland Security was created by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and opened in March 2003, merging 22 agencies and about 170,000 people. It was the largest reorganisation of the federal government since the Department of Defense was created in 1947. It now employs more than 250,000 people on a budget of around $98bn.
Three things went wrong.
It was too big. Twenty-two agencies arrived with incompatible systems, rival cultures and separate congressional patrons. DHS has ranked last among large federal agencies in the staff engagement survey for eleven consecutive years.
It buried emergency management inside a counter-terrorism department. FEMA went in, and its first great test was not terrorism at all. When Hurricane Katrina struck in 2005 the response failed badly, and the criticism was that putting disaster relief inside a counter-terrorism department had cost it both its focus and its direct line to the President. Congress partly reversed the merger in 2006. The FEMA Act of 2025, before Congress now, would take FEMA out of DHS altogether and re-establish it as a freestanding agency.
And accountability fragmented rather than concentrated. The department answers to more than eighty congressional committees and subcommittees.
The American mistake was to merge everything and call it coherence.
My solution
For once I’m not taking someone else’s model and perfecting it. I don’t think any of those used elsewhere are optimal. Which means we have a chance to lead the world, not just to make our country more secure and more resilient.
My solution is a coherent approach, bringing together what belongs together, and giving someone responsibility. This will ensure there aren’t cracks or inefficiencies, and that there’s accountability.
Put together what belongs together. Protecting our citizens, our real borders, our virtual borders, and the critical national infrastructure they all depend on.
What is critical national infrastructure needs some definition. Here’s my list:
Utilities. Energy - electricity/oil/gas, water - clean drinking water and sewage treatment, telecommunications, data. Generation, refining, storage, and distribution as applicable.
The flow of goods and services. Food and agriculture, transport and logistics including the so-called cold chain (which would have picked up the fridges that have recently been attacked), fuel distribution, medicines, chemicals.
The systems of trust. Finance and payments, cash, government data and identity, elections, legal and property records.
The protectors. Emergency services, hospital capacity, civil nuclear, the defence industrial base.
The state itself. Continuity of government, military and security sites, nuclear command and control, secure communications.
Today we are protecting all of these against three different kinds of adversary: state-sponsored actors, organised criminals, and thrill-seekers. They want different things and they need different answers, but they come through the same doors.
Carve out from the Home Office a new Department for Homeland Security and Resilience with four areas of responsibility:
National Security. MI5 and counter-terrorism, retaining the direct ministerial link, sitting alongside policing so that intelligence and counter-terrorism police share a roof and a budget line.
Public Safety. Policing policy and funding, the National Crime Agency, serious and organised crime, and cyber.
Border Defence. Border Force as a uniformed law enforcement agency, with customs enforcement, counter-smuggling and maritime security alongside it.
National Resilience Command. A permanent operational body, not a committee, owning prevention, preparation, and response. Continuous coordination of the risk register, Local Resilience Forums, national stockpiles, and standardised exercises. It bridges the other three areas, so that when a flood or a cyberattack or a pandemic arrives, uniformed personnel, logistics and state assets can be mobilised by someone whose job that is.
The National Resilience Command can’t own the fifth group on that list. Continuity of government sits with the Cabinet Office and nuclear command and control sits with the Prime Minister personally, and neither should move. What the Command owns is everything that keeps the country running, and the duty to tell the Prime Minister when the thing he alone controls is at risk.
COBR moves. The Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms, and the Civil Contingencies Secretariat that runs them, come out of the Cabinet Office and into the new department. The Prime Minister can be invited whenever that is appropriate, and for the largest crises it always will be. But the responsibility sits with the department, because the people who prepare for a crisis should be the people who run the response to it. At present those are different buildings and different careers.
Devolution has to be built in from the start. Policing is devolved in Scotland and Northern Ireland, and civil protection is largely devolved across all three administrations. A UK-wide Resilience Command cannot direct a Scottish fire service or a Welsh local authority, and should not try to.
What it can do is set the standard, hold the risk register, run the national exercises, own the stockpiles and the reserves, and act as the single point through which UK-wide assets are mobilised. A statutory duty to co-operate in both directions, with the devolved administrations represented on the Command’s board and able to call on it. The model is mutual aid, not command and control, and it works that way already when a flood crosses a border.
Leave the rest with the Home Office. Visas, passports, asylum processing and citizenship move to a standalone non-ministerial agency, run like HMRC or the DVLA, with its own chief executive accountable for delivery and a minister accountable for policy rather than for queue length.
The courts stay independent. A leaner, faster security ministry will issue more warrants, more deportation orders and more emergency directives. Judicial review is the quality control on all of it, and during a genuine emergency the courts are the only body that can test whether a restriction on liberty is proportionate and time-limited. A more potent executive needs a judicial check and balance.
Prisons and probation stay in the Ministry of Justice. Putting prisons inside a security ministry would create a closed loop: the same minister who gains politically from more arrests also controls where to put the people arrested, and capacity loses that argument every time. Keeping them apart forces a useful institutional tension, with a Justice Secretary able to say that the estate cannot absorb what the policy produces.
That is the structural change that makes this solution work. It removes the overwhelming majority of the Home Office’s transactional work and all of its weekly political noise, and leaves a far smaller department whose entire purpose is keeping the country safe and ready.
It puts in place a Secretary of State whose job, every day, is to ensure that the country is safe and ready, with MI5, policing, the border and resilience under one roof, and nothing else competing for the diary. One minister, one accountability, one annual statement to Parliament on the state of national preparedness.
At the moment, if the next crisis finds us unprepared and is not handled optimally, as happened with COVID, there is no one to sack.
Summary
Britain has no minister whose job is to keep the country safe and ready. We have a muddle-headed method instead.
Carve a new Department for Homeland Security and Resilience out of the Home Office, with four responsibilities and nothing else competing for the diary.
National Security: MI5 and counter-terrorism, sitting alongside policing.
Public Safety: policing policy and funding, the National Crime Agency, serious and organised crime, cyber.
Border Defence: Border Force as a uniformed law enforcement agency, with customs, counter-smuggling and maritime security.
National Resilience Command: a permanent operational body owning prevention, preparation and response, with COBR and the Civil Contingencies Secretariat brought in from the Cabinet Office.
Visas, passports, asylum and citizenship go to a delivery agency run like HMRC. The courts stay independent. Prisons stay with Justice. The devolved administrations sit on the Command’s board rather than underneath it.
One Secretary of State. One accountability. One annual statement to Parliament on the state of national preparedness.
This should be done in any eventuality. Three things make it urgent:
The significantly increased threat level, and the ready availability of more sophisticated tools for bad actors whatever their motivation.
The increased frequency of extreme weather events.
The next pandemic, while the last one is reasonably fresh in the collective memory.
Much better than today’s muddle-your-way-through ad-hockery. And a clear signal to the electorate about what’s important: them and their safety and security.
𝚃𝚑𝚎 𝙾𝚗𝚎 𝙼𝚊𝚗 𝚃𝚑𝚒𝚗𝚔 𝚃𝚊𝚗𝚔
